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AbstrAct 
Most theoretical accounts in the current literature on North American integration consider the imple-
mentation of side and parallel environmental agreements to the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (nafta) and their corresponding institutions either a side-effect of the national governments’ 
pursuit of their economic interests or the result of successful pressure by non-governmental orga-
nizations to include their socio-environmental demands in the treaty. These opposite explanations 
closely resemble liberal intergovernmentalist and transnational-focused accounts used to ex-
plain the occurrence and progression of regional integration in Europe. This article reviews and 
challenges both accounts and argues that they both assess inadequately the interests of govern-
mental and transnational actors and their roles and relative influence in determining the outcome 
of the negotiations of the nafta side and parallel agreements on the environment. It proposes 
that a revised liberal intergovernmentalist account that considers the non-economic national in-
terests of nation-states would explain better the pursuit and negotiation of nafta’s environmental 
side and parallel agreements and the institutional structure that resulted from them. 
Key words: North American environment, regional integration, nafta, liberal intergovernmen-
talism, transnationalism.
resumen
La mayoría de las explicaciones teóricas en la literatura actual sobre integración en América del 
Norte consideran que la implementación de los tratados ambientales complementarios y para-
lelos al Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (tlcan), y sus instituciones correspon-
dientes, es un efecto colateral de la búsqueda de los intereses económicos de los gobiernos 
nacionales, o el resultado exitoso de la presión ejercida por las organizaciones no gubernamen-
tales (ong) para incorporar sus demandas socioambientales a la negociación del tlcan. Estas 
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explicaciones, opuestas en naturaleza, se asemejan a las teorías intergubernamental liberal y 
transnacionalistas utilizadas para explicar la incidencia y el progreso de la integración regional 
en Europa. Este artículo examina y desafía ambas explicaciones teóricas y argumenta que am-
bas evalúan inadecuadamente los intereses de los actores gubernamentales y transnacionales, 
y sus roles e influencia relativos en la determinación del resultado de las negociaciones de los 
tratados complementarios y paralelos al tlcan sobre el medio ambiente. Propone que una teo-
ría intergubernamentalista liberal revisada, que tome en consideración los intereses nacionales 
no económicos de los Estados-nación, explicaría mejor la búsqueda y negociación de los acuer-
dos complementarios y paralelos al tlcan sobre el medio ambiente, y la estructura institucional 
que resultó de ellos.
Palabras clave: medio ambiente en América del Norte, integración regional, tlcan, interguber-
nmentalismo liberal, transnacionalismo.
IntroductIon
In January 1994, two side and parallel environmental agreements between Canada, 
the United States, and Mexico came into effect along with the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (nafta): the North American Agreement on Environmental Coop-
eration and the U.S.-Mexico Border Environment Cooperation Agreement. To adminis-
ter them, the governments established three regional institutions: the (North American) 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (cec), the North American Develop-
ment Bank, and the (U.S.-Mexico) Border Environment Cooperation Commission. 
The agreements’ implementation and the creation of these institutions, aimed at pro-
tecting and enhancing the North American environment, made the three countries’ 
domestic environmental policies trilaterally interdependent.1 
To date, most accounts in the current literature on North American integration 
consider the agreements’ implementation and the creation of these institutions as 
either a side-effect of the pursuit of national governments’ economic interests or the 
result of successful pressure by non-governmental organizations to include their de-
mands in nafta’s negotiations. On the one hand, most North America-focused schol-
ars argue that national governments –most prominently, the U.S.– dominate this 
integration process (Wise, 1998; Appendini and Bislev, 1999; Cameron and Tomlin, 
2000; Weintraub, 2004; Studer Nóguez and Wise, 2007; Clarkson, 2008; MacDonald, 
1  Following Gilardi (2014), interdependence is defined as the influence the decisions and actions that a given 
nation-state takes in the pursuit of its national interests have on the policy choices of other nation-states. This 
pursuit imposes or produces significant constraints, costs, and/or benefits for other states, and vice versa. 
Should this influence be mutual, it can be argued that the nation-states in question are interdependent.
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2008; Ayres and Macdonald, 2012; Duina, 2016). In their view, transnational actors 
and/or regional institutions either exercise very limited influence on this process or 
none at all (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000; Clarkson, 2008; Hale and Blank, 2010; Ayres and 
MacDonald, 2012; McKinney, 2015). According to these scholars, the occurrence 
and progression –or lack thereof– of North American integration, including the im-
plementation of nafta’s environmental agreements, is satisfactorily explained by 
theoretical accounts based on the analysis of national governments’ interests, positions, 
and actions. I argue that these explanations closely resemble liberal intergovernmen-
talist accounts of the occurrence and progression of European regional integration. 
On the other hand, a smaller number of scholars highlight the influence of 
transnational actors in determining the extent of this process, even if not its current 
pace or direction. According to these scholars, society-oriented, labor, and environ-
mental civil society organizations in the three countries, and especially in the U.S., 
pressed the national governments into negotiating and implementing environmen-
tal and labor agreements alongside nafta as a condition to its approval in their cor-
responding domestic legislatures (Raustiala, 1996, 2003, 2004; Bugeda, 1998; Kibel, 
2001; Markell, 2004, 2005; Knox and Markell, eds., 2003). In these accounts, transna-
tional actors significantly influenced the negotiation and implementation of nafta 
by broadening the scope of the overall bargain to incorporate and establish environ-
mental and labor side and parallel accords to the main agreement, which the Cana-
dian, U.S., and Mexican governments did not originally pursue.2 This explanation, 
then, closely resembles recent “transnational”-centered theoretical approaches that 
emphasize the role of transnational actors (that is, neither governments nor regional 
institutions) to explain the occurrence and development of European integration 
(Hurrelmann, 2009; 2011).
I review both accounts and argue that they both inadequately assess the inter-
ests of governmental and transnational actors, and their roles and relative influence 
in determining the outcome of the negotiations of nafta’s side and parallel agreements 
on the environment. I argue that both “purely” liberal intergovernmentalist- and 
transactionalist-like accounts of this process overlook significant features of the nafta 
deal and its institutional outcome that reveal national governments’ non-economic 
interests and the very limited capacity of transnational actors to act as a cohesive group 
with coherent demands. I propose, then, to review and reassess more adequately, 
even if briefly, the origins and occurrence of North American integration better than 
currently dominant accounts do. In doing so, I also aim at demonstrating the relevance 
2  Given the focus of this article, I do not discuss further the nafta’s side agreement on labor, i.e. the North 
American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (naalc).




of European integration theories to the North American case, through the com-
parative use of the liberal intergovernmentalist and transnationalist approaches. I argue 
that this kind of revised account would better explain the original and current extent, 
pace, and direction of North American integration, including its expansion toward 
“non-economic” policy areas.
To do so, I first briefly describe and discuss the emergence of environmental 
cross-border rules and regional institutions in North America. Then, I summarize the lib-
eral intergovernmentalist- and transnationalist-like accounts often used to explain the 
emergence and development of North American integration. I argue that although 
the theorization of this process has been very limited, the accounts that are currently 
provided to explain it closely resemble those used to explain the emergence and de-
velopment of European integration. I discuss and analyze the relevant policy and 
institutional developments in the region and the roles of governmental and transna-
tional actors. Finally, I review the current explanations for the emergence of this pro-
cess and show their ability to more adequately explain the extent, pace, and direction 
of this process. I argue that doing so will contribute to demonstrate the relevance of 
(European) integration theories to the study of the North American case.
the emergence of envIronmentAl cross-border rules 
And regIonAl InstItutIons In north AmerIcA
Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. cooperation on environmental issues was very limited 
before the implementation of nafta and naaec in the 1990s. Although trilateral consul-
tation among these countries on related matters dates as far back as the late nineteenth 
century, no trilateral cross-border rules existed prior to these agreements.3 Prior to 
nafta, these issues had not been raised in the negotiation or functioning of bilateral, 
trilateral, or multilateral agreements between the North American countries, includ-
ing the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (cusfta). When the Canadian, Mexican, 
and U.S. governments started to negotiate nafta at the beginning of the 1990s, they 
3  Before nafta and naaec, trilateral intergovernmental engagements between the North American govern-
ments were limited in both scope and frequency, and, for the most part, took place in multilateral fora. Al-
though government officials from all three countries had been calling for dealing with environmental 
issues in a trilateral and institutionalized form since the 1890s, the national governments opted to maintain 
separate consultative bilateral mechanisms, burdened by significant obstacles to cooperation, well into the 
1990s. These high-level bilateral consultations between the U.S. and Mexican and the U.S. and Canadian 
governments were usually circumscribed to the discussion of single issues (for example, distributing water 
in bodies located along their common borders or countering pollution in the areas surrounding them). Due 
to their remedial focus, however, these consultative mechanisms commonly failed to prevent, identify, or 
effectively address cross-border environmental problems.
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did not expect existing environmental issues to affect its negotiations (Knox and 
Markell, eds., 2003).
By the early 1990s, however, intra-regional trade and foreign direct investment 
among the three countries had already been growing significantly. When the nafta 
negotiations started, civil society groups in the three countries raised concerns about 
the social and environmental impact that increased cross-border economic exchanges 
would have in their communities. Most of these groups argued that such exchanges 
would impact negatively on the three countries’ environment by prompting a “race 
to the bottom” for trade and investment.4 They said that firms and investors would 
seek to take advantage of the uneven economic development and enforcement of 
environmental laws in North America, which were claimed to be especially low and 
weak in Mexico (Weintraub, 1990; Shrybman, 1993; Husted and Logsdon, 1997). In 
their view, nafta should incorporate explicit means of enforcement (such as trade 
sanctions) to ensure that its implementation would not lead to environmental degra-
dation in their countries or the rest of North America. In response, government officials 
in the three countries committed to not downgrade or weaken domestic environ-
mental laws and standards owing to the implementation of nafta. They rejected, how-
ever, creating enforcement mechanisms (including trade penalties) in cases of failure 
to enforce environmental laws, arguing that doing so would generate trade distor-
tions that would hinder the gains expected from implementing the agreement. At 
the same time, they acknowledged that rejecting such proposals outright could lead 
to continued (and, possibly, growing) opposition from civil society groups. To avoid 
obstacles in passing nafta in their legislatures, the three governments then resolved 
to negotiate and implement the naaec as a side agreement to nafta.5 Meanwhile, to ad-
dress the specific needs of the area along their shared border, the U.S. and Mexico 
resolved to also negotiate and implement the beca as a parallel agreement to nafta, as 
Canada expressed no interest in taking part in it.
4  These groups’ concerns varied considerably and were at times even conflicting. Some, for instance, argued 
that the increased cross-border trade resulting from nafta would lead to environmental degradation in 
their communities, especially in those located along the U.S.-Mexico border. Others argued that the liberal-
ization of foreign direct investment in North America would result in a region-wide race to the bottom, as 
environmental standards would be reduced –or further reduced– to attract investment and jobs. It was said 
that this phenomenon would especially affect the U.S. and Canada, as environmental regulations were 
purportedly stricter in these countries than in Mexico (Bugeda, 1998: 1592; Scott, 2003: 1). Finally, others 
argued that liberalized trade and investment would result in the relocation of environmentally-harmful 
foreign companies from the U.S. and Canada to Mexico, where they would allegedly benefit from laxer 
environmental regulations.
5  The nafta side agreements (naaec and naalc) are not part of the main bargain. They are, instead, trilateral 
agreements entered into by Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. to address labor and environmental issues and 
concerns related to the effects of the implementation of nafta. As a parallel agreement, beca is not part of 
nafta itself either.




At first glance, these agreements resemble other international, intergovernmen-
tal instruments aimed at protecting the environment. The naaec’s main objectives are
•  fostering the protection and improvement of the domestic environment in the 
three countries;
•  increasing trilateral cooperation for the conservation, protection, and enhance-
ment of North America’s environment; and
•  enhancing compliance with and enforcement of domestic environmental laws, 
policies, and regulations throughout the region.
To accomplish these three objectives, the naaec recognizes each country’s right to 
determine its own level of environmental protection, set its own environmental poli-
cies and priorities, and adopt or modify its laws and regulations accordingly. At the 
same time, however, the naaec creates obligations for the national governments to ensure 
that their domestic laws and regulations provide for high levels of environmental 
protection; enforce such safeguards; and aim at continually improving them. This com-
bination of national governments’ rights and obligations constitutes naaec’s raison d’être: 
ensuring the effective enforcement of domestic environmental laws in North America 
through the implementation of a regional agreement that sets cross-border rules.
To ensure fulfillment of these obligations, the naaec mandated the establish-
ment of the (North American) Commission for Environmental Cooperation (cec).6 
This institution oversees the agreement’s implementation, facilitates collaboration 
among the national governments, and fosters public participation for the conserva-
tion, protection, and enhancement of the North American environment. This last 
provision is especially important. First, it enables the North American public, i.e. in-
dividuals and ngos in any of the three countries, to protect and enhance the region’s 
environment even beyond the borders of their own countries. And second, it gives 
the cec jurisdiction to address “almost any environmental issue that might arise in 
the continent” and that the public might bring to its attention through the Submis-
sion on Enforcement Matters (sem) process (Knox and Markell, 2003: 11). The Border 
Environmental Cooperation Agreement (beca), meanwhile, aims at strengthening 
cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico on environmental issues and preventing 
6  The cec’s institutional structure resembles that of other international bodies. It is made of a Council, a Sec-
retariat, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee (jpac). The Council is the cec’s governing body and is made 
up of the environmental ministers of each country. The Secretariat conducts most of the cec’s day-to-day 
work and assists the Council in fulfilling its responsibilities. It is also responsible for managing and consid-
ering, in the first instance, citizen submissions on enforcement matters. Finally, the jpac fosters public par-
ticipation in the cec’s work, aims at ensuring transparency in cec activities, and advises the Council and 
Secretariat on environmental priorities and issues of concern to the North American public.
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damage to the environment in the area along their common border, resulting from 
the operation of nafta. To fulfill these aims, the beca established two bi-national in-
stitutions: the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (becc) and the North 
American Development Bank (nadb). They are both charged with evaluating and 
providing administrative and financial support and resources for developing and 
improving environmental infrastructure in the area.7 To fulfill their mandates, they 
have quasi-independent budgets whose allocation is not subject to changes by na-
tional or sub-national administrations.8 Along with the trilateral cec, the becc and 
nadb constitute North America’s regional environmental institutions.
theorIsIng north AmerIcAn IntegrAtIon
Do Liberal Intergovernmentalism or Transnationalism explain the Pursuit,  
Negotiation, and Implementation of nAftA’s Environmental Agreements?
To date, most of the academic and non-academic literature on North America is still 
focused primarily on the study of nafta and its effects on the economies –and, to a 
lesser extent, societies– of Canada, the U.S., and Mexico. The nature, functioning, 
and effects of the operation of nafta’s side and parallel agreements on labor and en-
vironment are far less discussed and studied. This is due to the seeming consensus 
among academic and non-academic analysts of North American integration that the 
process is limited only to the functioning of trade and investment agreements among 
the three countries over the past fifty years.9 Such an interpretation leads most scholars 
and commentators to conclude that the process does not involve “non-economic” 
policy issues. Most of them argue that the Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. national gov-
ernments –and especially the latter– dominate this integration process, and largely 
or entirely determine its scope, pace, and direction. In their view, the process is restricted 
7  The becc and nadb are complementary. The becc reviews and certifies the technical, environmental, and 
social viability, impact, and expected benefits of environmental projects applying for nadb funding. If the 
project’s positive impact and long-term financial sustainability are ensured for the sponsor, investors, and 
intended beneficiaries, the nadb finances it. Initially, the nadb financed only water supply, wastewater, 
and solid waste treatment projects.
8  Although their budgets cannot be altered unilaterally, the institutions can and have been affected by under-
funding. In past years, the U.S. administrations of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump have failed 
to provide the institutions with their corresponding national contributions to their budgets. In practice, 
these failures have compromised their capacity and power to fulfil their mandates adequately, even if, in 
principle, their budgets remain unchanged (Mosbrucker, 2016).
9  Starting with the U.S.-Canada Auto Pact in 1965; continuing with the cusfta in 1988 and nafta in 1994; and 
peaking with the defunct Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America in 2005.




to the operation of a handful of intergovernmental agreements whose negotiation 
and implementation enabled governments to achieve their common economic inter-
ests, while maintaining their own political sovereignty and policy-making powers. 
Their accounts, consequently, focus on national governments’ interests, positions, 
and actions to explain the occurrence and progression –or lack thereof– of North 
American integration. In their view, the existence and operation of regional institutions 
involving environmental and labor issues do not change the primarily economic and 
intergovernmental nature of this process, as the institutions were allocated with very 
limited responsibilities and very constrained capacities to meet them.10
Most of the current explanations of North American integration, then, strongly 
resemble the Liberal Intergovernmentalist (li) accounts provided for the existence and 
progression of integration in Europe. In li accounts, national governments play the 
foremost role in the integration process, and their economic interests are termed 
“the more intense, certain, and institutionally represented” of all their corresponding 
national interests (Moravcsik, 1998: 47; 2006; Schimmelfennig, 2015: 727). The pursuit 
of regional integration by states results, then, from their interest in reaping the eco-
nomic benefits of cross-border trade and investment through policy coordination. To 
achieve coordination, states engage in careful intergovernmental bargaining, and then 
secure agreements by establishing limited cross-border rules and weak regional institu-
tions whose sole purpose is to ease their interactions. Given their constrained nature, 
such rules or institutions do not challenge the states’ ultimate policy-making author-
ity. Instead, they reinforce it by enabling them to pursue their shared primary economic 
interests. Following li claims, it could be argued that the U.S., Mexican, and Canadian 
governments sought, negotiated, and implemented nafta’s side and parallel environ-
mental agreements in pursuit of their economic interests. To support this argument, it 
could be noted that, by the start of the 1990s, increasing economic exchanges between 
these countries in the form of rising intra-regional trade and foreign direct invest-
ment had created considerable economic interdependence among them.11 As these 
exchanges became increasingly important to their domestic economies, incentives 
emerged for the three national governments to purposely expand them.
However, the negotiation and proposed implementation of a trilateral free trade 
and investment agreement faced noticeable opposition from civil society organizations. 
10  The dominant assumption in the current literature is that North American integration is an intergovern-
mental process centred on trade and investment issues. I discuss and review the impact of this assumption 
on the study of this process in Farías Pelcastre (2017).
11  The U.S. accounted for almost three quarters of Canadian and Mexican trade with the world, while trade 
with Canada and Mexico accounted for one quarter of overall U.S. trade (author’s calculations based on data from 
North American Transportation Statistics [2012], Statistics Canada [2013], and U.S. Census Bureau [2013]).
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This could jeopardize the passing of nafta in the national legislatures. The national 
governments therefore addressed this risk by proposing, negotiating, and imple-
menting environmental agreements, enabling them to pursue and secure the passing 
of nafta in their respective legislatures. In these accounts, the creation of the cec, becc, 
and nadb would have merely served to lock in and enhance the credibility of the 
mutual commitments among national governments. Their proponents argue that to 
ensure that these institutions not gain any relevance in domestic policy-making, the 
governments charged them with limited responsibilities and allocated them mini-
mal resources and powers to carry out their duties. Should this account be accurate, 
it would support the li view of institutions as passive actors that are created and ex-
ist only to enhance the credibility of intergovernmental commitments (Moravcsik, 
2006: 292). It would also explain adequately the preferences of the Canadian, Mexi-
can, and U.S. governments for promoting limited intergovernmental cooperation on 
the protection of the North American environment, rather than creating region-wide 
environmental laws and standards backed by concrete means of enforcement. Fol-
lowing the li premises, the environmental agreements would have been mere instru-
ments for securing nafta.
There are, nonetheless, “transnational” accounts of the creation and implemen-
tation of these agreements. These argue that civil society organizations’ very visible 
opposition to the negotiation and implementation of nafta did influence the deci-
sions of the North American governments to propose and negotiate the naaec and 
beca. The claim that the implementation of these agreements resulted partly –or en-
tirely– from pressures exerted on national governments by the civil societies, non-
governmental organizations, and some state, provincial, and local authorities in the 
three countries is not uncommon in the current academic literature (Bugeda, 1998; 
Mumme, 1999; Knox and Markell, eds., 2003; Varady, 2009). Disagreement exists, 
however, over the extent that they did. Some scholars argue that the opposition to 
nafta significantly altered the bargain and its result. For instance, Varady argues 
that the Mexican, Canadian, and U.S. governments agreed to implement agreements 
and create regional institutions on the environment to “placate this influential sector 
of civil society” (that is, environmental groups, especially in the U.S.), who demand-
ed the states create rules and institutions to protect “the continent’s environment 
and especially the fragile … U.S.-Mexico border region” (2009: 1). Meanwhile, Knox 
and Markell go further and argue that civil society groups pressured the national gov-
ernments into negotiating these agreements –hence, making of nafta a “significantly 
different [agreement than that which these governments] had originally envisaged” 
(2003: 2). Finally, Mumme argues that “nafta’s critics,” that is, civil society organiza-
tions, “forced [the governments into establishing these] institutions and programs” 




to ensure the protection of the North American environment from trade-induced 
degradation (1999). Transnational-focused accounts of North American integration, 
then, emphasize the role of transnational actors, namely, interest groups, in shaping 
the outcome of the nafta bargain, much in the way that transnationalist accounts of 
European integration do in its own regional context.
In the European context, scholars argue that transnational actors influenced the 
integration process “not at the expense of, but in addition to, the role of national 
governments” (Gehler and Kaiser, 2001: 775). According to these accounts, the extent, 
pace, and direction of European integration are both determined by “a multilateral 
bargaining process driven by clear-cut national (economic) interests” and the interac-
tions between actors operating below the governmental level and across national 
borders (Gehler and Kaiser, 2001: 798). It follows that transnational actors contribute 
to developing and furthering European integration by engaging “knowingly and 
intentionally” in cross-border transactions (that is, exchanges of goods, services, 
and ideas) (Hurrelmann, 2009: 10). These activities contribute to establishing and 
maintaining linkages between countries, and, when aggregated, are said to exert sig-
nificant and direct influence in domestic decision-making processes, in turn shaping 
regional policy outcomes.
In the North American context, however, “purely” liberal intergovernmental 
or transnationalist accounts are problematic. On the one hand, the accounts focused 
on governmental actors overstate the economic interests of the North American na-
tion-states, and especially those of the U.S., in pursuing and securing nafta, at the 
expense of their non-economic interests. They assume that national governments 
were –almost– entirely focused on securing the economic benefits that increased 
cross-border trade and investment that nafta would promote, but did not consider, 
or simply disregarded, the social and environmental impact and externalities of in-
creased exchanges on their populations and territories. Should national governments 
have truly ignored (or overlooked) these concerns, it is unlikely that individuals or 
civil society organizations would have managed to push for the creation of environ-
mental agreements and instruments, or subsequently, for making changes to such 
instruments. On the other hand, should civil society organizations and individuals 
in the three countries have decisively influenced governments and shaped the re-
sulting agreements, it is unlikely that the agreements or the institutions they estab-
lished would have lacked enforcement powers.12 Finally, the emphasis on the 
12  In fact, some transnational actors were so patently dissatisfied with the proposed environmental side and 
parallel agreements and institutions that they continued expressing their opposition to the nafta bargain 
even after its signing and implementation (Johnson and Beaulieu, 1996: 34).
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concerns of civil society organizations as grounds for the establishment of environ-
mental agreements does not adequately explain the different positions of the three 
national governments regarding such agreements. For instance, these accounts cannot 
adequately explain why Canada participated in naaec, but not in beca, as originally 
proposed; or why the U.S. initially proposed creating a stronger regional environmen-
tal institution that could potentially bring into question its sovereign policy-making 
decisions, policies, and practices on this issue/area. I argue that these interests and 
differences in positions can only be explained by looking simultaneously at the eco-
nomic and non-economic interests that the three governments had in pursuing, ne-
gotiating, and implementing –or not– naaec and beca.
To address these issues, I put forward an alternative to purely intergovernmen-
talist- and transnationalist-like accounts, for the proposal, negotiation, and imple-
mentation of the North American environmental agreements. I claim that, if this 
account is accurate, it would better explain the pace, extent, and direction of North 
American integration.
An Alternative Explanation of North American Integration
In opposition to current accounts, I submit that these agreements resulted from the 
pursuit of the corresponding economic and non-economic interests of the Canadian, 
Mexican, and U.S. governments, which, at the outset of this process, were only mar-
ginally influenced by the concerns of civil society organizations on the environmen-
tal impact of nafta. In this alternative explanation, the governments had two sets of 
interests in pursuing and achieving the environmental agreements:
•  a primary, common economic interest in securing the passage of nafta in the 
three national legislatures to create and implement cross-border rules on trade 
and foreign investment in North America; and,
•  a secondary, asymmetrical socio-environmental interest in protecting their own 
populations from (further) environmental degradation.
In the face of civil society organizations’ opposition to nafta, the Canadian, U.S., 
and Mexican national governments resolved to negotiate and implement environ-
mental agreements, which secured the passing of the trade and investment agreement, 
while addressing several environmental externalities resulting from the current and 
expected economic exchanges among them. Given that such externalities could not 
be solved effectively through domestic decision- and policy-making, these countries 




required entering into intergovernmental agreements. In these, the three govern-
ments consistently pursued and mostly achieved their common economic interests. 
Their distinct socio-environmental interests, however, resulted in the signing and 
implementation of two separate agreements that established three institutions with 
dissimilar jurisdictions, responsibilities, and powers to accomplish them. The cur-
rent institutional framework for protecting and enhancing the North American envi-
ronment is a direct result of these interests.
At its outset, North American integration was a manifestly intergovernmental, 
but not exclusively economic, process. Over the past 23 years, however, its nature 
has changed as the cross-border rules and regional institutions have become increas-
ingly complex and influential, a circumstance that the national governments did not 
originally intend or anticipate. The creation of cross-border rules enabled transnation-
al actors to demand national and sub-national governments address environmental 
issues and externalities resulting from increased cross-border economic exchanges 
among their countries by creating regional institutions. These institutions have pro-
actively and purposely sought ways and means to foster the participation of trans-
national actors in protecting the region’s environment. This demand-and-response 
dynamic has resulted in changes to the domestic policies, practices, and decisions of 
national and sub-national governments that would not have otherwise occurred. In 
fact, at times, these changes have been manifestly opposed by governmental actors.
To reassess and reinterpret the emergence and development of cross-border 
rules for the protection of the North American environment and the roles of govern-
mental, regional, and transnational actors in prompting –or hindering– these institu-
tional developments in a better manner than current accounts do, I assume that all 
these actors make rational choices. That is, their positions and decisions on a given 
policy issue and their behavior within a given institutional context are determined 
through the evaluation of a range of possible outcomes and alternatives available to 
pursue them. Through this evaluation, the actors determine and rank their preferred 
outcomes and, in turn, choose the best course of action to achieve them. Just like 
governmental actors, transnational actors (that is, individuals and civil society orga-
nizations) and regional institutions have goals and preferred outcomes and means 
to achieve them. Moreover, actors taking part in an integration process also aim at 
bolstering their position vis-à-vis other actors. For instance, as the institutions respond 
to demands from transnational actors, that is, using, applying, interpreting, and even 
modifying the existing rules, their actions result in institutional changes that pro-
gressively expand and advance their scope and significance.
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reInterpretIng the nAtIonAl Interests And posItIons 
In nAftA’s envIronmentAl Agreements
Current interpretations of the North American integration emphasize to different 
extents the roles of various actors in the process. Depending on the account under 
review, it is argued that either national governments or transnational actors played a 
decisive role in shaping its institutional outcomes. Both intergovernmentalist and trans-
national accounts acknowledge that from the moment it was proposed, nafta faced 
strong opposition from environmental groups –especially, but not exclusively, in the 
U.S. The disagreement between these accounts lies in the extent to which such op-
position shaped the outcome of the nafta bargain. A reinterpretation and reassess-
ment of the proposal, negotiation, and securing of the agreement confirm its decidedly 
intergovernmental, but not solely economic, nature as it is commonly argued.
First, civil society organizations did not constitute a cohesive group with well-
defined demands or comparable access or influence in their own domestic political 
systems. For instance, even before the terms of the agreement were determined, many 
organizations in the U.S. had already expressed their resolute opposition to nafta. 
They claimed that free and increased trade between the U.S. and its neighbors –particu-
larly Mexico– would impact negatively on the environment in their communities. In 
the U.S., these groups opposed the agreement but did not engage with policymakers to 
advance and look for representation of their positions on the national agenda. Some 
other groups, meanwhile, sought and secured support from legislators in Congress 
to prevent the agreement’s approval and implementation. In general, U.S. legislators 
conveyed and expressed this dissatisfaction at the lack of environmental safeguards 
in nafta. Many of them, however, partially favored the agreement’s negotiation and 
implementation. Therefore, they only conditioned their support to the inclusion of pro-
visions and mechanisms that protected their communities –especially those located 
along the U.S.-Mexico border– from (further) environmental degradation. To ensure 
the inclusion of such safeguards, the U.S. Congress passed the nafta Implementa-
tion Act of 1993, which outlined the conditions sent to the executive for approving 
the agreement’s negotiation and entry into force (U.S. gpo, 1993). Nonetheless, the 
Clinton administration estimated that only some groups opposing nafta had enough 
political clout to disrupt the congressional vote and prevent the agreement from being 
passed. Therefore, the executive focused only on meeting the demands of those key 
groups and concluded that by making some changes, nafta would gather enough 
support to pass Congress. To fulfill these demands, the executive pursued and secured 
the negotiation and implementation of both naaec and beca. The former would contrib-
ute to preventing trade-induced damage to the North American environment and 




the weakening of U.S. environmental laws and standards. The latter would address the 
specific demands of communities along the U.S.-Mexico border for restoring and 
improving the environmental conditions in their areas (McFadyen, 1998).
Besides securing the approval of nafta, however, the U.S. government had a 
secondary socio-environmental interest in pursuing naaec and beca to address prob-
lems affecting U.S. communities, most urgently, those located in the area along the 
border with Mexico.13 Various U.S. national and sub-national governments and their 
administrations had previously attempted to address environmental issues affecting 
this area. However, the continuous growth in population, trade, and industry there; the 
vast economic differential between the two countries; and the lack of investment in 
environmental infrastructure on both sides of the border had prevented them from 
achieving long-term, effective solutions. The government (particularly, the Clinton ad-
ministration), then, had a strong interest in pursuing and achieving naaec and beca to 
protect its population from (further) environmental degradation resulting from in-
creased economic exchanges (Carmona Lara, 1993: 299-302).14
The U.S. government was not the only one with a two-fold set of national inter-
ests in pursuing the North American environmental agreements. It is widely as-
sumed that Mexico’s position as the economically weakest partner significantly (or 
entirely) determined its interest in pursuing nafta’s environmental agreements. Ac-
cording to some scholars, Mexico regarded the negotiation and implementation of 
naaec and beca as only prerequisites to attaining the main trade and investment agree-
ment and, in turn, gaining and securing improved access to the U.S. market (Vega Cáno-
vas, 2003; Clarkson, 2008: 120). According to their accounts, the administration of 
Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari was very concerned about potential hold-
ups to the negotiation and ratification of the agreement. To ensure the attainment of 
nafta, Mexico was willing to agree to any demands from their trading partners, 
namely, the U.S. Hence, it pursued the environmental agreements. These accounts 
are simplistic and inadequate. Instead, I argue that Mexico had a set of primary eco-
nomic and secondary environmental interests, comparable to that of the U.S.
13  During the 1960s, some areas along the U.S.-Canada border faced problems like those experienced on the 
U.S.-Mexico border in the 1990s, including severe damage to shared bodies of water, extreme air pollution, 
and rain acidification.
14  For instance, then-Governor Clinton criticised President George Bush, Sr.’s approach to the nafta negotia-
tions claiming that the “agreement appears to be lacking substantive provisions on … environmental 
clean-up in Mexico” and protection of the environment in the U.S.-Mexico border area (The New York 
Times, 1992). As president, Clinton then instructed his administration to include these objectives in the 
nafta negotiations. The U.S. Department of State instructed its negotiators to achieve two objectives: first, 
ensuring that the growth in trade generated by nafta “is accompanied by increased cooperation between 
… governments on environmental issues; [and, second,] protecting the U.S. and its citizens from environ-
mental degradation” (1998: 98).
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I claim that Mexico’s interests went well beyond securing the agreement. First, 
the country had an economic interest in carefully shaping the environmental agreements 
and their institutions to prevent their use as tools for “disguised protectionism” by 
the U.S. and Canada (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000: 185). The Mexican government op-
posed the creation of a strong regional institution to enforce region-wide environ-
mental regulations, as it considered that such an institution could potentially reduce 
the free flows of trade and foreign direct investment to the country. Furthermore, the 
U.S. and Canada could use such an institution as an instrument to protect their mar-
kets from Mexican competition by setting non-tariff barriers (Carmona Lara, 1993). 
Mexico then rejected the Clinton administration proposal to establish a regional in-
stitution with power to enforce the countries’ own domestic environmental laws, as it 
deemed it inadmissible (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000: 184). It was willing, however, to 
help the U.S. improve the prospects of passing the nafta Implementation Act in the 
U.S. Congress, while ensuring that neither the U.S. nor Canada would gain a com-
petitive advantage over Mexico. To meet both objectives, it proposed establish-
ing regional environmental agreements and institutions with weaker mandates and 
enforcement powers than those originally proposed by the U.S., but strong enough 
to help the U.S. executive to meet the requirements of the nafta Implementation Act.
The Mexican government had a secondary interest in securing funding for 
building and improving its environmental infrastructure and enhancing the well-
being of its population, especially in communities along its 3 145 km-long border 
with the U.S. By the beginning of the 1990s, industrial and population growth, the 
sustained rise in trade and manufacturing, deficient sanitation infrastructure, and a 
lack of investment in public services had severely degraded the environment in the 
U.S.-Mexico border area. On the Mexican side, the limited or complete absence of 
municipal or state funding to address these problems, along with the reluctance of the 
federal government to allocate funds to the area, further complicated this situation.15 
When nafta negotiations began and the need for committing to an environmental 
agreement became increasingly evident, Mexico seized the opportunity to secure fi-
nancial support to address its infrastructure deficiencies (becc, 2009). When the U.S. 
proposed establishing a regional institution charged with overseeing and enforcing 
environmental laws across North America, the Mexican government proposed setting 
up a North American development fund that would help address infrastructure defi-
ciencies (including, but not limited to, environmental ones) in Mexico, through 
15  The federal government was reluctant to invest public funds in an area that was purportedly becoming 
one of the wealthiest in the country and that was then allegedly able to fund the development and en-
hancement of its own infrastructure.




U.S.- and Canada-funded grants. The U.S. and Canada recognized the need to help 
Mexico in developing its infrastructure. While the U.S. found the proposal politically 
contentious, Canada dismissed it entirely and refused to participate (Zamora, 2008: 121). 
In response, Mexico scaled down its proposal. The fund would only provide finan-
cial support for improving environmental infrastructure along the U.S.-Mexico bor-
der. The U.S. accepted this revised proposal, but Canada still expressed no interest in 
participating. Mexico and the U.S. agreed then to pursue and implement the Border 
Environmental Cooperation Agreement (beca) as a bilateral agreement to be signed and 
implemented parallel to nafta. In other words, the agreement would be negotiated 
alongside nafta, but signed and entered separately by the two countries only.
It can be argued that Canada’s interest in negotiating naaec but staying out of 
beca resulted from its own pursuit of economic and socio-environmental interests, 
comparable to those of the U.S. and Mexico. Canada’s federal government had two 
primary economic interests in pursuing and achieving these agreements. First and 
foremost, attaining nafta was a way of securing the trade advantages it had made 
through cusfta. It is worth recalling that Canada originally joined the then-bilateral 
negotiation of the U.S.-Mexico free trade agreement to protect its own fta with the 
U.S. Faced with the prospect of a bilateral trade agreement between these two coun-
tries, Canada sought and secured access to the deal. Comparatively, then, for Cana-
da, negotiating and entering into environmental agreements was only “a minor” –if 
controversial– condition for realizing nafta (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000: 206). Second, 
Canada aimed at preventing U.S. protectionism through trade sanctions for non-
trade issues, including environmental ones (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000: 188-200; 
Clarkson, 2009: 15). In this regard, the Canadian government supported the creation 
of a regional environmental institution, but found the idea of establishing an inde-
pendent commission with sanctioning powers “particularly difficult to accept” (Knox 
and Markell, 2003: 8). Canada deemed such an institution a possible risk to the trade 
gains already made under cusfta and those expected from nafta, as the U.S. could 
use it to hinder trade.16 Up until the end of the negotiations, then, Canada opposed 
creating a regional institution with enforcement powers.
Notwithstanding this strong opposition to granting enforcement powers to the 
proposed (North American) Commission for Environmental Cooperation (cec), Cana-
da also had a secondary socio-environmental interest in negotiating and entering 
16  During the nafta negotiations, a Canadian representative argued that implementing trade sanctions for 
violations of environmental laws and regulations was “overkill, dangerous for the U.S. and Mexico and 
totally unacceptable for Canada” (Clarkson, 2009: 15). Prime Minister Kim Campbell made a similar re-
mark when she intervened directly in the nafta negotiations and declared that Canada “did not support 
the use of trade sanctions for non-trade issues” (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000: 198).
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the naaec. Namely, it aimed at preventing degradation of its environment resulting 
from downward competition for jobs and investments both with the U.S. and Mexi-
co and among its own provinces. Canada also aimed at preventing “the anticipated 
widespread negative outcomes (i.e., race to the bottom, pollution havens) [that might] 
emerge as an outcome of the economic integration of North America” (Environment 
Canada, 2007: 23). At the domestic level, the Canadian federal government sought to 
prevent its provincial and local governments from competing with those of the U.S. 
and Mexico by lowering environmental laws, standards, or slackening their enforce-
ment. For Canada, the simultaneous negotiation of nafta and naaec was therefore 
advantageous as it brought together its interests in protecting its domestic environ-
ment while securing the gains achieved through cusfta (Environment Canada, 2007: 
19). On this same basis, Canada also declined to participate in the creation of an en-
vironmental fund for Mexico, or the U.S.-Mexico border area. Although the Clinton 
administration proposed that Canada contribute to the fund, the country saw little 
connection between the clean-up and improvement of the environment in the U.S.-
Mexico border area and the facilitation of trade or expansion of economic opportuni-
ties throughout North America. Arguing that the proposed fund reflected bi-national 
concerns over the degradation of the environment along the U.S.-Mexico border, 
Canada expressed no interest in participating in it (Gantz, 1996: 1028). The agree-
ment was hence negotiated between the U.S. and Mexico only, and the resulting in-
stitutions, the nadb and becc, were created parallel to nafta.
This description of the negotiations shows that all three countries pursued two 
sets of interests: a primarily economic interest in attaining nafta to reap the benefits 
of freer and increased trade and investment in North America and secondary, dif-
ferentiated socio-environmental interests. The combination of these interests result-
ed in diverging positions and strategies that shaped the naaec and becc accords and 
their institutional outcomes.17 For instance, the U.S. pursued and entered trilateral 
and bilateral environmental side and parallel agreements to nafta to address the 
environmental problems of communities located along its border area with Mexico. 
Similarly, Mexico entered the agreements to secure trade advantages and funding for 
creating or improving environmental infrastructure in its border area with the U.S. 
Moreover, Mexico had an interest in shaping naaec to ensure that the U.S. would not 
use this agreement’s rules for protectionist purposes. Finally, the connection –and 
lack thereof– between the economic and environmental interests and goals of the 
North American governments in the naaec negotiations is even more evident in 
17  McKinney (2000), Knox and Markell, eds. (2003), and Knox (2004) describe the naaec negotiations in more 
detail and analyze how they shaped the authority and functions of the cec.




Canada’s case. For Canada, its participation in naaec contributed to consolidating 
the federal government’s economic and environmental agenda. It protected the 
gains made in cusfta while ensuring that the provincial governments would not en-
gage in downward competition for jobs and investments with the U.S. and Mexico. 
Given that Canada also had a secondary interest in protecting its territory and popu-
lation from possible environmental degradation, it had incentives to participate in 
the trilateral North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (naaec). 
Nonetheless, given that it shared no border with Mexico and the dissimilarity in the 
socio-economic conditions of the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico border areas, the Ca-
nadian government had no incentive to participate in the bilateral beca, which had 
been originally proposed as a trilateral accord for promoting development and im-
provement of (environmental) infrastructure throughout Mexico.
On this basis, I argue that in the negotiations of the North American environmen-
tal agreements, the national governments achieved their separate economic and envi-
ronmental interests. During the negotiations phase, the nation-states –specifically their 
heads of government– were primarily in control of the integration process. Given that 
the outcome of these negotiations was the signing of intergovernmental agreements, 
some scholars argue that the nature of the process itself is intergovernmental. Their ac-
counts partially support, then, the li arguments, which claim that nation-states can ef-
ficiently pursue and secure their interests in negotiations. According to the li approach, 
states define their national interests through domestic contention between interest 
groups within the nation-state over a given set of preferences. Once determined, such 
preferences become national interests and, in turn, intergovernmental bargaining ob-
jectives. However, a “purely” liberal intergovernmentalist account, based only on the 
examination of states’ economic national interests, would fail to adequately account 
for the proposal, negotiation, and outcomes of the trilateral naaec and the bilateral beca.
The three governments regarded naaec as a requirement for securing nafta to 
purposely expand their economic exchanges and address the environmental exter-
nalities of such increased interactions. This was not the case of beca. Had transnational 
actors been the key force shaping the development and outcome of the negotiations, 
as transnationalist-like theorists of North American integration claim, the naaec would 
have been significantly stronger, characterized by strict and enforceable regional 
rules on environmental protection and backed by trade sanctions in cases of non-
compliance. Similarly, had transnational actors had as much influence over the negotia-
tions and their outcome as is commonly argued, it is likely that a trilateral fund to 
improve and enhance the region’s environment, especially Mexico’s, would have been 
created. The li approach only partly explains, then, the interests of the U.S., Canadian, 
and Mexican governments in negotiating and entering into these agreements. A revised 
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liberal intergovernmentalist account that considers nation-states’ non-economic nation-
al interests would explain better than transnationalist-like accounts do the pursuit 
and negotiation of nafta’s environmental side and parallel agreements, as well as the 
institutional structure that resulted from them.
conclusIon: once IntergovernmentAl, AlwAys IntergovernmentAl?
Although it could be argued that li-like accounts of North American integration 
might adequately explain the origins of this process, they do not satisfactorily explain 
its overall development to date. The everyday use of the cross-border rules and the 
actions of transnational actors (including individuals, communities, activists, and 
non-governmental organizations) and regional institutions have changed the origi-
nal intergovernmental nature of the process, even if in a limited manner and only in 
the environmental policy arena.
The implementation of naaec and beca and the creation of cec, becc, and nadb are 
innovations in the environmental policy area in North America. Cross-border rules on 
environmental protection did not exist in North America before the implementation of 
nafta’s side and parallel agreements (naaec and beca) in 1994. Although bilateral col-
laboration and cooperation on environmental issues between Canada, the U.S., and 
Mexico go back to the early twentieth century, the governments did not engage each 
other trilaterally until the implementation of these agreements. Before them, there were 
bilateral and bi-national but not regional agreements or institutions on these issues. 
Their implementation and operation over the past 23 years filled a gap in the institution-
al framework for the conservation, protection, and enhancement of the region’s envi-
ronment by addressing some of the socio-economic and environment-related concerns 
of individuals, non-governmental organizations, and border communities on the im-
plementation of nafta. During and after the negotiations of this trade agreement, vari-
ous individuals, non-governmental organizations, and other civil society groups in the 
three countries argued that its implementation would result in a rapid degradation of 
the North American environment, especially in the U.S.-Mexico border area.
Purely liberal intergovernmentalist or transnational accounts of North Ameri-
can integration cannot adequately explain why and how transnational actors have 
used the cross-border rules, which were created by, agreed among, and purportedly 
suited to the interests of national governments. To date, these rules have been used to 
pursue changes to environmental practices, policies, and legislations throughout the 
three North American countries with moderate to significant success. Moreover, they 
cannot adequately explain the entrepreneurial nature that the regional institutions 




have displayed when addressing demands raised by North American citizens through 
the institutional mechanisms for public participation created by nafta’s side and 
parallel environmental agreements.
It should also be underscored that the cec, becc, and nadb are not supranational 
institutions. Consequently, none of them possesses ample powers, autonomy, or hu-
man or material resources to push for the use, development, and improvement of 
cross-border rules. They have, however, been venturesome in expanding their compe-
tencies by broadly interpreting their mandates. At times, this proactive behavior has 
enabled them to modify the provisions of the intergovernmental agreements in ways 
that the national governments had not intended. The demands of transnational actors 
and the responses of regional institutions to them contributed to increasing the rele-
vance of cross-border rules to policy-making and policy implementation in the region. 
Transnational actors could not have achieved these outcomes without the active en-
gagement of the regional institutions on the policy issues that they raised. Despite their 
constrained resources and power, over more than 24 years of operation, the three insti-
tutions have worked to expand their jurisdictions and mandates. During this time, 
they have transformed themselves into the most important institutions for environ-
mental protection in North America at the regional level, even surpassing in impor-
tance long-standing bilateral and bi-national institutions that have historically dealt 
with environmental issues.18 Contrary to the rigid, reactive bi-national institutions that 
predated them, the new regional institutions have contributed to reviewing, reaffirm-
ing, and advancing the rules in ways that both addressed the demands of transna-
tional actors and expanded their jurisdictions and mandates and strengthened their 
own capacities. I argue that these policy developments have significantly increased 
the degree of environmental policy interdependence among the three countries. 
These policy developments, often disregarded in the current literature on North 
American integration, indicate that the process is more complex and extensive than 
is generally acknowledged. The substantive change from the non-existence of cross-
border rules to their creation by national governments is an important development 
in the integration process. The increasingly important role of transnational actors and, 
most importantly, regional institutions indicates that even a revised liberal intergov-
ernmentalist might have difficulties explaining the current state of North American 
integration, especially in the environmental policy area. An approach that takes into 
account the combined actions of transnational actors and regional institutions is likely 
to explain better the most recent institutional and policy developments in this arena.
18  Namely, the International Boundary and Water Commission (ibwc), established in 1889 between the U.S. 
and Mexico, and the International Joint Commission (ijc), established in 1909 between the U.S. and Canada.
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